A developmental systems account of human nature by Stotz, Karola & Griffiths, Paul E.
Abstract 
To understand human nature is to understand the plastic process of human development and the 
diversity it produces. Drawing on the framework of developmental systems theory and the 
idea of developmental niche construction, we argue that human nature is not embodied in 
only one input to development, such as the genome, and that it should not be confined to 
universal or typical human characteristics. Both similarities and certain classes of differences 
are explained by a human developmental system that reaches well out into the ‘environment’. 
We point to a significant overlap between our account and the ‘life history trait cluster’ 
account of Grant Ramsey. We defend the developmental systems account against the 
accusation that trying to encompass developmental plasticity and human diversity leads to an 
unmanageably complex account of human nature.  
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3 
A Developmental Systems Account of Human Nature 
Karola Stotz and Paul Griffiths 
3.1 Current State of the Debate 
The characteristics and causes of human nature are one of the oldest and most contested 
topics of inquiry. A scientifically credible account of human nature must assimilate and 
integrate findings from the biological, psychological, and social sciences. Contemporary 
philosophical work on human nature sets out to do this, but it also tries to stay in touch with 
older ideas about human nature. Almost all authors have accepted the Darwinian challenge 
and recognized that the human species is not defined by a fixed, inner essence. But despite 
this rejection of essentialism, many authors remain attached to the idea that human nature is 
confined to the left-hand side of the dichotomies between nature and nurture, innate and 
acquired, biology and culture (Machery 2008; Kronfeldner forthcoming).1 
This attachment reflects the fact that enquiries into human nature start from an everyday 
(‘vernacular’) idea of human nature and try to honour some of the intuitions associated with 
that idea. The vernacular conception of human nature is an expression of an implicit ‘folk 
theory’ of biological development, which has at its heart a distinction between traits that 
come from ‘inside’ and those imposed from ‘outside’. We and our collaborators have 
                                                
1 But see Downes and Machery (2013) for a collection of different views; Fuentes et al. (2010) for a 
collection of essays providing an anthropological challenge to a unitary theory of the human; and 
Lewens (2012a) for an extremely permissive, if not eliminativist, notion of human nature. 
conducted empirical research to characterize this folk theory in more detail (Griffiths 2002; 
Griffiths et al. 2009; Linquist et al. 2011). The folk theory of animal natures is an instance of 
‘psychological essentialism’ (Medin and Ortony 1989; see also Gelman 2003) and the 
essential, inner nature of an animal is associated with traits that are fixed in development, 
typical of the species, and teleological—the animal is intended to have this trait. When this 
folk theory of animal natures is applied to humans, it produces the vernacular idea of human 
nature. We describe our ‘three-factor’ model and related psychological research in section 
3.2. 
The problem with the vernacular idea of human nature is that it confounds three 
important but essentially independent biological properties. A trait can be fixed without being 
typical or having a purpose, it can be typical without having a purpose or being fixed, and it 
can have a purpose without being fixed or typical. This is one reason why so many 
developmental biologists and psychologists have rejected a simple dichotomy between innate 
and acquired characteristics (Lehrman 1953; Hinde 1968; Gottlieb 1970; Bateson 1991). The 
shortcomings of the vernacular idea of human nature are similar to the shortcomings of the 
pre-scientific concept of heat. Whether an object feels ‘hot’ depends on three physical 
quantities that can vary independently of one another—temperature, quantity of heat, and 
conductivity. Using these three, more precise ideas, we can explain what people are 
responding to when they say something is hot; but the original idea is not a useful construct 
with which to do science. 
In this chapter, we defend a view of human nature that goes beyond the vernacular idea, 
in the same way that the physics of heat went beyond the phenomenological notion of things 
being hot. We argue that such an idea must fulfil several desiderata: it must be explanatory 
and not merely descriptive; it should make human nature an object of inquiry in the human 
sciences (all those disciplines that take the human species or some aspect of it as their 
subject, from physiology through psychology and anthropology to sociology); a science of 
human nature should explain the folk-biological features traditionally aligned with the idea of 
human nature in  a way that makes clear why they won’t do as defining features of human 
nature; and, lastly, our concept of human nature should embrace human diversity, plasticity, 
and polymorphism, because these are important aspects of the evolutionary design of human 
beings. We outline these desiderata in more detail in section 3.3. 
We will argue that there are two extant theories that meet these requirements: Grant 
Ramsey’s life history trait cluster (LTC) account (Ramsey 2013) and the developmental 
systems (DS) account of human nature (Griffiths 2011). In section 3.4, we outline the basic 
similarity between these two, namely, that both are grounded in human developmental 
biology. Both accounts suggest that to understand human nature is to understand the plastic 
but not unstructured process of human development. 
While we are in agreement with much of Ramsey’s account, in section 3.5 we draw 
attention to some differences between the two accounts. One major difference is that our 
account focuses more strongly on the human developmental environment as a critical factor 
in human nature. Drawing on the framework of developmental systems theory and the idea of 
developmental niche construction, we argue that human nature is not embodied in one input 
to development, such as the genome. The patterns of similarity and difference amongst 
human beings are explained by a human developmental system that reaches well out into the 
‘environment’. 
We also emphasize that developmental systems theory creates a dynamical, process 
perspective on human nature. Human nature is underpinned by a range of mechanisms of 
extended inheritance, as well as genetic inheritance, and the life course of any individual 
human being depends upon a matrix of exogenetic developmental factors—the 
developmental niche. The fundamental unit of analysis in our approach is a process—a 
human life history (Griffiths and Stotz forthcoming). 
3.2 The folk-biological idea of human nature 
Our account of the folk-biological conception of human nature builds on work in cognitive 
anthropology and child psychology that identified a pattern of essentialistic thinking—
psychological essentialism—about living things across many human cultures and in human 
children (Atran 1990; Berlin 1992; Medin and Atran 1999; Medin and Atran 2004; Gelman 
2003). It gains additional support from psychological research on the ‘genetic essentialism 
framework’ by psychologist Ilan Dar-Nimrod and collaborators. Our earlier work with our 
collaborators constructed a ‘three-factor’ model of folk-biological thought about animal 
natures; provided some experimental evidence for this model; and showed that in 
contemporary English, the idea of ‘nature’ is expressed by saying things are ‘in the DNA’ 
(Griffiths et al. 2009; Linquist et al. 2011). At around the same time, Dar-Nimrod and 
collaborators set out to study lay understandings of genetic causation, and documented a set 
of ‘genetic essentialist biases’ that correspond closely to elements of the three-factor theory 
of animal natures (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011a, 2011b; Dar-Nimrod and Lisandrelli 2012; 
Dar-Nimrod et al. 2012; Dar-Nimrod et al. 2014; Cheung et al. 2014). 
The three-factor model proposes that there is a folk-biological, implicit theory of 
development in which some but not all characteristics of animals are expressions of a ‘nature’ 
inherited from their parents and which makes them the kind of animal that they are—a 
human, a chimp, or a kangaroo. Phenotypes that stem from this inner nature are expected to 
have three characteristics: fixity, typicality, and teleology. Fixity means that the phenotype is 
hard to change by environmental means. Typicality means that the phenotype is found in all 
or most members of the species (or of some natural subset such as a sex or an age group). 
Teleology means that the phenotype is part of the design of the organism. It is there for a 
reason, and organisms that lack these features are not how they are meant to be (see section 
3.3, point 3 for a naturalistic interpretation of teleology). In Table 3.1 we show how these 
factors line up with elements of the genetic essentialist framework (GEF). 
The GEF suggests that genetic attributions for various traits, conditions, or diseases 
activate four specific psychological processes, or genetic essentialist biases. The first bias, 
termed immutability/determinism, is that thinking about genetic attributions leads people to 
view relevant outcomes as less changeable and predetermined. To the extent that a 
phenomenon is perceived to be immutable, it will be perceived to be beyond someone’s 
control. Genetic attributions decrease perceptions of control over relevant outcomes (Dar-
Nimrod et al. 2012; Parrott and Smith 2014) and limit the perceived capability of other 
means, such as environmental manipulations or individuals’ volition, to modify the outcome 
(Jayaratne et al. 2009). The second genetic essentialist bias, termed specific etiology, is a 
tendency to discount additional causal explanations once genetic attributions are made. 
Hence, genetic attributions increase the likelihood that people will disregard alternative 
casual attributions for complex phenomenon (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011a). Whereas the 
first two genetic essentialist biases focus on individuals, the third, termed 
homogeneity/discreteness, concerns groups. Essentialist thinking leads people to focus on the 
central identifying features that are common to all group members, drawing attention away 
from in-group differentiating features. This leads people to view individual members of a 
category as more homogeneous, which may contribute to stereotyping and more prejudiced 
attitudes toward group members (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011a). The final genetic 
essentialist bias is termed naturalness. Genetic attributions increase the likelihood that a 
relevant outcome is perceived as a natural outcome. It is widely agreed in both philosophy 
and psychology that viewing an outcome as natural has important normative overtones. 
<COMP: INSERT TABLE 3.1 NEAR HERE – see end of document> 
The vernacular idea of human nature from which so many philosophical analyses start is 
simply the application of this form of essentialist thinking to humans. It seeks to divide 
human characteristics into those imposed by the environment and those that stem from an 
inner nature, and embodies the assumption that the three characteristics of fixity, typicality, 
and teleology are strongly associated with one another because traits that stem from our inner 
nature have these three properties and traits imposed by the environment do not. 
However, this intuitive picture of biological development is fundamentally mistaken. All 
phenotypes are produced by a combination of genetic and environmental factors, and in many 
cases epigenetic factors. The patterns of interaction between these factors are many and 
varied, and do not conform to two distinct patterns, one of which is characteristic of traits that 
have been designed by natural selection. Some philosophers have conceded this, but 
suggested that there is a continuum, with evolved traits clustered at one end. However, in our 
view the plausibility of this idea comes not from reviewing the evidence, but from the 
continued influence of the folk-biological picture (Griffiths and Machery 2008; see also 
Mameli and Bateson 2006, 2011). 
3.3 Desiderata for an account of human nature 
In this section we ask which desiderata a scientifically credible contemporary conception of 
human nature should seek to fulfil. Kronfeldner and collaborators have distinguished three 
main epistemic roles for the concept of human nature (Kronfeldner et al. 2014; Kronfeldner 
forthcoming). The first is a definitional or classificatory role: human nature defines the 
boundary of the human and determines which individuals are members of the human species. 
The second is a descriptive role: the concept collects the cluster of traits characteristic of the 
human life form. This can be seen as making human nature an explanandum, something that 
stands in need of explanation. The second role is therefore complemented by a third role: the 
concept as an explanans, identifying the underlying mechanisms or factors that explain why 
humans have this cluster of traits. There is also a fourth, normative role for the concept in 
answering the question of what a ‘typical’ or ‘proper’ human ought to be. While this is one of 
the most important traditional roles of the concept of human nature, it has few supporters in 
philosophy of biology (a seminal critique in this field is Hull 1986). Philosophers who still 
try to use human nature for this normative purpose do not derive their account of human 
nature from biology (e.g. the neo-Aristotelian accounts reviewed in Glackin 2016). If species 
had fixed, typical, and teleological natures in the way that folk biology supposes, then human 
nature could fulfil the first three roles Kronfeldner identifies, and perhaps the fourth. But 
since there are no such natures, a scientifically credible concept of human nature must be 
somewhat revisionary. It will give people something of what they originally wanted from a 
concept of human nature, but not everything. 
We believe that a good concept of human nature should fulfil the following desiderata: 
1. It should be explanatory and not merely descriptive. One of us has argued elsewhere 
that a purely descriptive idea of human nature is relatively uncontroversial (Griffiths 
2011). After all, there is a range of sciences that deal with humans, and many of these 
sciences are successful, which implies that one can abstract away from the 
particularities of individual human lives to discover commonalities. We suggest that 
in addition a concept of human nature needs to address what causes these 
commonalities: it needs to fulfil an explanatory role. 
2. This leads to our second desideratum: a useful concept should make human nature an 
object of inquiry in the human sciences: the sciences that deal with human beings as a 
kind. For example, physiology tries to understand functional processes in the human 
body; psychology studies the human mind, its underlying processes, and the 
behavioural characteristics it produces; sociology investigates the human kind in 
terms of social relations and institutions; cultural anthropology is the comparative 
study of these matters; and so forth. 
3. A third desideratum concerns the relationship between a new conception of human 
nature and the existing, vernacular conception. The new conception cannot include as 
defining conditions of human nature all the features that are associated with the 
vernacular concept. As we have already mentioned, these are essentially independent 
biological properties that we should not expect to be tightly associated with each other 
(Griffiths 2011). But there are important properties that some human phenotypes 
exhibit, and a concept of human nature should recognize this. For example, the fixity 
of traits can be explained by canalization (Waddington 1942), and the fact that there 
are canalized traits should be part of our understanding of human nature. Typicality is 
not a defining feature of human nature, but the fact that there are some typical 
features of human beings needs to be encompassed by our understanding of human 
nature. Teleology is today standardly explained via evolutionary adaptation—some 
features really are there by evolutionary ‘design’ and others are not—so our 
understanding of human nature should recognize that our nature is in part the outcome 
of evolutionary design.2 
                                                
2 One problematic aspects of the teleological way of thinking is its resistance to counter-evidence. The 
nonexistence of a so-called essential trait among a large number of members of a population can 
4. Finally, contra Edouard Machery (2008), universality is not a desideratum for a 
concept of human nature (Ramsey 2012, 2013). If the human species is polymorphic, 
then this is part of the nature of the human species, something we should seek to 
understand when we study human beings as a kind. Many organisms also exhibit 
some form of phenotypic plasticity, the evolved ability to respond with different 
phenotypes to different environments (Gilbert and Epel 2009; Sultan 2015). This too 
is an important part of the nature of the species in question. In suggesting that the 
features of human nature must be universal, Machery is responding to a real feature of 
the vernacular concept of human nature, but one that clashes with what we have 
learned about biology since Darwin. So our fourth desideratum is that human nature 
should admit of polymorphism and plasticity. 
In summary, then, we propose that a concept of human nature should make human nature 
something that explains many features of human beings; that it should make human nature an 
object of enquiry for the human sciences; that it should make room for developmentally fixed 
and species-typical traits, and for the fact that some traits are the result of evolutionary 
design; and finally that it should accommodate the fact that humans are diverse and plastic. 
Amongst the many accounts of human nature offered by philosophers, two meet these 
desiderata. The first is Grant Ramsey’s life history trait cluster (LTC) account of human 
nature (Ramsey 2013) and the second is the developmental systems (DS) account of human 
nature (Stotz 2010; Griffiths 2011). In the next section we explain the similarities and 
complementarities of these two accounts, and in section 3.5 we turn to the differences 
between them. 
                                                                                                                                                  
always be explained as the failure of those individuals to realize their proper nature (we thank Tim 
Lewens for this comment). 
3.4 LTC and DST: human nature as human development 
So what is the LTC account? Ramsey acknowledges that human beings are diverse, with each 
individual life history including a different mix of traits. His account focuses on the patterns 
of co-occurrence between traits in this population of diverse life histories: 
Human nature is defined as the pattern of trait clusters within the totality of 
extant human possible life histories. Thus, if one were to take all of the 
possible life histories that form the basis for individual nature, and then 
combine them, one would possess the set of life histories that forms the basis 
for human nature, since the trait distribution patterns in this set of life histories 
constitute human nature. (Ramsey 2013: 987) 
Two ideas are combined in this proposal, both of which are central to developmental systems 
theory: first, ‘from an evolutionary point of view an animal is the implementation of a life-
history strategy’; second, ‘bringing order to that diversity is not about identifying universal 
elements, but about finding order in the patterns of similarity and difference’ (Griffiths 2011: 
325, 328). In fact, as we now go on to show, the two accounts are remarkably convergent, 
albeit arriving at their conclusions from very different starting points. 
Ramsey identifies two key desiderata for an account of human nature: that it  accord both 
with scientific practice and with intuitive notions of human nature. The first demands its 
empirical accessibility as a subject to the human sciences, which is in line with our second 
desideratum. Ramsey also wants his account of human nature to clarify the related concepts 
of ‘innateness and naturalness’ (2013: 986). This requirement has something in common with 
our third desiderata: that a concept of human nature should shed light on the phenomena of 
typicality, fixity, and teleology. Ramsey’s account also embraces developmental plasticity 
and diversity, and so meets our fourth desideratum. 
There are other similarities between the two accounts. Ramsey eschews any 
classificatory role for human nature: an organism is human because it is a member of a 
particular lineage, not because it displays the LTC property clusters. He also eschews a 
normative role for human nature: his account may illuminate the idea that some traits are 
‘natural’, but it is not intended as an account of how human beings should be. We agree with 
both of these points. 
Ramsey sometimes seems to regard his account as merely descriptive and not 
explanatory: ‘characterizations of features of human nature are merely descriptions of 
patterns within the collective set of human life histories’ (2013: 988). This apparently clashes 
with our first desideratum, which calls for an explanatory account of human nature. For two 
reasons, however, we do not see this as a major difference between our accounts. First, 
Ramsey’s life history trait clusters are exactly what our developmental systems account of 
human nature explains, which makes his account complementary to ours. Second, we believe 
that Ramsey actually presents an account of how individual traits that make up the trait 
cluster can be explained by human nature. 
Ramsey’s account is more than merely descriptive, we think, because it does not simply 
list features as a description of human nature. The account focuses on the identification of 
‘antecedent’ (A) and ‘consequent’ (C) traits of life histories that have been found to be 
associated with each other. Further experiments should then be carried out, Ramsey suggests, 
to determine if As and Cs are causally related rather than merely correlated. This would 
amount to an experimental programme to establish constraints on the possible trajectories 
within life-history space, and hence the beginning of an explanation of human nature, as well 
as a description. 
Ramsey sketches a quasi-formal account of human nature, involving a ‘human-nature 
space’. This is not the state space of human life histories, as in the last paragraph, but a 
theoretical space in which to locate and compare particular trait clusters. It has two 
dimensions: the ‘pervasiveness, p, of the antecedent’, defined as ‘the proportion of life 
histories that exhibit that trait’, and the ‘robustness, r, of the antecedent-consequent 
association’ (we are unclear if r is simply a correlation, something like the regression of the 
consequent on the antecedent, or more explicitly a causal measure). One can increase p by 
choosing a more broadly defined antecedent, but this will typically reduce the robustness of 
its association with a consequent. Equally, adding more antecedent traits—make it more 
complex—can increase r, but at a cost to p. Hence there is a trade-off between p and r, or 
between simplicity and strength (Ramsey 2013: 989–90). 
Ramsey argues that one can make sense of both innateness and naturalness in terms of 
positions within the p–r space. It may be natural, part of human nature, for humans that have 
property A to also have property C—for example, being female (A) and menstruating (C). 
Since human nature is also associated with traits being innate, innateness could be interpreted 
in various ways in terms of the p–r space. Either the higher the r-value, the more innate a trait 
is; or innateness can be defined as association with both a high p-value and a high r-value; or, 
since neither of these two proposed definitions of innateness implies ‘not learned’, one could 
restrict the term ‘innate’ to A–C links that involve no learning. This, Ramsey (2013: 991) 
admits, might exclude most, if not all, associations, ‘since learning is woven into the causal 
fabric of so much of development’. 
Ramsey (2013: 987) notes that an LTC account of human nature may seem 
‘spectacularly—and perhaps disastrously—permissive’ and ‘extremely inclusive’. However, 
Ramsey argues that although LTC is in principle very permissive, in that it includes all trait 
associations, it does not imply that all these associations are equally interesting. He proposes 
the p–r space as a way to distinguish the more interesting features of human nature, those 
most worthy of study in the science of human nature. Insofar as these interesting trait 
associations are the ones that are more ‘natural’ or ‘innate’, this seems to us to be another 
residual influence of the folk-biological conception of human nature. In any case, Ramsey 
does not need to defend himself against this criticism. As we explain in the next section, the 
idea that accounts of human nature should not be ‘permissive’ or ‘inclusive’ is simply 
mistaken. 
Finally, Ramsey claims that while his account is not normative, it nevertheless has 
‘moral implications’. Since this account gives us robust insight into the human condition, 
good and bad, it could guide action via desired or unwanted antecedent–consequent 
associations (Ramsey 2013: 992). That biology can have moral implications in this 
straightforward way has often been noticed: ‘Starving children stunts their growth and ruins 
their health and this is one reason not to starve them’ (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999: 5). 
3.5 The developmental systems account of human nature 
The developmental systems account describes human nature in a way very similar to 
Ramsey. Organisms are fundamentally processes (Griffiths and Stotz forthcoming)—life 
cycles—and heredity is the reconstruction of the life cycle using resources that are passed on 
by previous generations. Some of these resources are genetic, some epigenetic, and some 
exogenetic—the last term referring to a ‘developmental niche’ that contains reliable 
developmental resources from outside the organisms.3 Some exogenetic resources serve to 
canalize development, and some to modify it and hence enable developmental plasticity. 
Developmental systems theorists have long recognized Ramsey’s point that a single 
lineage has many possible developmental trajectories: ‘life cycles may have a disjunctive 
                                                
3 For an account of the unique features of human nature that accords a very substantial role to the 
developmental niche, see Sterelny (2012, 2003). 
form, with different individuals having different characteristics. A developmental system can 
proliferate by producing a range of outcomes on different occasions’ (Griffiths and Gray 
1994: 296). Descriptive human nature is the ‘order in the patterns of similarity and 
difference’ in these human life cycles (Griffiths 2011: 328). 
Developmental systems theory explains human nature as the product of the human 
developmental system, a matrix of genetic, epigenetic, and exogenetic resources within 
which the developmental process or life cycle unfolds. This system is constructed by earlier 
human life cycles and by feed-forward effects from the development of the individual itself. 
Progress in understanding human nature, on this view, is simply progress in the sciences of 
human development: developmental biology, developmental psychobiology, and 
developmental psychology (for a brief history of DST and the scientific research traditions 
from which it emerged, see Griffiths and Tabery 2013). 
Ramsey’s fear that the LTC account might be criticized as ‘spectacularly—and perhaps 
disastrously—permissive’ echoes the assessment by Kronfeldner and collaborators of the 
developmental systems account of human nature: 
The result is a concept of an all-inclusive human nature that comprises all the 
resources needed to stabilize the development of the patterns of similarity and 
difference observable in humankind. Human nature, the thing that explains 
and defines the human species, is then a genealogically anchored explanatory 
essence of gigantic proportions, namely the whole developmental system of 
humankind, including the developmental niche [… this is] a very distant 
relative of the traditional concept of human nature, since it construes 
everything involved in and resulting from human development as part of 
human nature. It is doubtful whether such an all-encompassing concept of 
human nature is of any concrete use for the sciences, that is, for describing and 
explaining commonalities or explaining differences within humankind or 
between the human and other species. (Kronfeldner et al. 2014: 649; emphasis 
added) 
This is a non sequitur: the observations made about the DST account do not support the 
conclusion. In fact, the DST account has a better prospect of ‘describing and explaining 
commonalities or explaining differences’ than does the ‘traditional concept of human nature’, 
which excludes much of human diversity. If the aim was to pick out some individuals as not 
human or as less human, then we might need a simple definition of the human, like a CO1 
gene barcode, but hopefully no one is trying to do that! If, instead, the aim of studying human 
nature is to understand what human beings are like and why they are like that, then we see no 
reason why either the description of human nature or its underlying explanation should be 
simple. It seems obvious that both will be complex. 
Kronfeldner et al. seem to be echoing a common criticism levelled at developmental 
systems theory: that paying attention to the role of the environment in development and to the 
plasticity of development will make the study of development scientifically intractable and its 
results incomprehensibly complex. The same accusation has been levelled against the 
scientists whose work inspired DST, and the reply is the one those scientists gave—
‘development is complicated’ (Bateson 1991: 19). Complex interactions between genetic, 
epigenetic, and exogenetic factors explain the constraints on developmental trajectories in the 
state space of possible human life histories that constitute human nature on our view, and on 
Ramsey’s view as we interpret it.4 It would be convenient if these could be reduced to a few 
                                                
4 A difference between Ramsey’s account and our own may concern the status of the genome, which 
DST put on a much more equal footing to the environment than it enjoys on the LTC account: ‘If 
genes were allowed to vary, individual nature would be vacuous since sufficient changes to genes 
could, say, change an American into an aardvark. By contrast, varying the way that an individual 
simple parameters, like the average velocity of molecules in a gas, but it is clear that they 
cannot.5 
Developmental systems theorists have repeatedly emphasized that an inclusive definition 
of the developmental system does not mean that the whole system must be studied at once, 
any more than the inclusive definition of the proteome precludes studying individual protein–
protein interactions (Griffiths and Gray 2005; Oyama 2000). The concept of the 
developmental niche, which seems to be of particular concern to Kronfeldner et al., is a 
construct from empirical research on behavioural development (West and King 1987). It was 
introduced into DST to give greater structure to the extra-organismic component of the 
developmental system (Stotz and Allen 2012; Stotz and Griffiths 2016). The developmental 
niche concept has been used to great effect in such different fields as the development of 
social behaviour and communication in birds (West and King 1987, 2008), and species-
typical development in general in rats (Alberts 2008). Other research groups have applied 
DST’s view of development and the concept of the developmental niche to investigate 
aspects of human development (Alberts and Ronca 2012; Gros-Louis et al. 2014; Gros-Louis 
et al. 2016; Narvaez et al. 2013). None of this research has become mired in an 
unmanageable sea of complexity because it recognizes that the human life cycle has evolved 
to make use of a highly specific developmental niche, or that interaction with this niche may 
induce developmental plasticity. 
Developmental systems theory does not make it possible to sum up human nature in a 
slogan, but it does point clearly to the body of knowledge that constitutes our current best 
                                                                                                                                                  
encounters its environmental heterogeneity reveals something about its nature’ (Ramsey, Ch. 2  
this volume). 
5 This is not to reject research programmes in systems biology that aim at substantial reductions in the 
complexity of development through identifying systems-level variables. 
understanding of human nature: human developmental biology, developmental 
psychobiology, and developmental psychology. When those sciences are complete, we will 
have a complete understanding of human nature. We fail to see the force of the objection ‘but 
that will be very complicated’. 
3.6 A distinctive feature of the DS account: human 
developmental niche construction 
While Ramsey focuses on descriptive property clusters that make up human nature, the 
developmental systems account focuses on the underlying processes that account for these 
clusters. Developmental systems theory subscribes to a process account of the organism, and 
this is reflected in its view of human nature. DST is a process theory because developmental 
systems are essentially extended in time (Griffiths and Gray 1994, 1997; Griffiths and Stotz 
forthcoming): 
[DST] seeks to explain developmental outcomes as the result of a dynamic 
process in which some of the interacting factors are products of earlier stages 
of the process, rather than as the result of the arrangement of pre-existing 
factors into a static mechanism. Even when factors exist independently of the 
developmental process, they are drawn into it and made part of a 
developmental ‘system’ by the unfolding process. (Griffiths and Stotz 
forthcoming) 
The focus on property clusters makes Ramsey’s LTC account look less processual. However, 
these properties are not merely properties of organisms, but properties of an organism at a 
time, and the property clusters that constitute human nature are correlations between what 
happens at one point in a life cycle and what happens at a later point. So Ramsey’s account 
actually fits a process view of the organism quite well. Moreover, Ramsey conceives of the 
series of events that make up an individual human being as a life history, the implementation 
of an evolved strategy for resource allocation across the lifespan. In our recent work 
(Griffiths and Stotz forthcoming) we have argued that it is a life-history strategy that 
constitutes the principle of identity which unites a series of events as a single life cycle, rather 
than a part of a larger cycle, or a process involving more than one individual. 
The main difference between the two accounts is that the DS account has a stronger 
focus on the role of the environment in constituting human nature. There is an old saying 
within anthropology that culture is not only part of human nature, but that our nature is 
culture. Some recent work on human evolution has emphasized the role of selective niche 
construction: the evolution of the unique characteristics of human psychology and social 
structure has been substantially driven by the selection pressures created by earlier 
psychologies and social structures (Laland et al. 2000; Sterelny 2012). Niche construction 
theory deals with the selective niche, defined by the parameters that determine the relative 
fitness of competing types in a population. In selective niche construction, earlier generations 
partly construct the selection pressures that act on future generations. But another aspect of 
human niche construction is that our development is dependent on a rich developmental niche 
of interaction with parents and other conspecifics, and with physical and cognitive artefacts 
from tools to languages. The developmental niche is defined by the parameters needed to 
ensure the reconstruction of the evolved life cycle. The concept of the developmental niche is 
designed to integrate and formalize the non-genetic yet heritable factors influencing an 
organism’s development (Stotz 2010, 2014, forthcoming; Griffiths and Stotz 2013).It was 
first proposed under the name ‘ontogenetic niche’ by developmental psychobiologists West 
and King (1987). 
In our current formulation of the concept (Griffiths and Stotz 2013, forthcoming), the 
developmental system consists of genetic resources, epigenetic resources, and an exogenetic 
developmental niche, which contains reliably inherited physical, social, ecological, and 
epistemic resources needed to reconstruct or—in the case of phenotypic plasticity—modify 
that developmental system. These resources can be actively constructed by the parents 
(producing the ‘parental effects’ of quantitative genetics) or by the larger group, co-
constructed by parent and offspring, or sourced passively from a stable environment. 
Wherever they come from, if there exists an evolutionary (historical) explanation for the 
interaction of the evolved developmental system with the resource, then that resource is part 
of the system. What evolves by natural selection is a relationship between the system and 
each resource. 
How does the developmental niche influence human development? Human babies are 
needy. They are born early in comparison to other primates, meaning that for several months 
postnatally, relative to other primates, human babies share characteristics of foetuses rather 
than of infants in those other primates (Trevathan 2011). Comparing brain size at birth among 
primates, humans should be born at 18 months of age. A large part of brain development 
takes place outside the uterus, allowing for much greater postnatal epi- and exo-genetic 
influence than for their ape cousins, which makes the early niche fundamental for human 
development. Over the course of human evolution, as brains became bigger and human 
infants more immature at birth, human childrearing practices evolved in tandem to ensure the 
survival of the helpless infant. As bipedalism, hemochorial placenta, large brains, and the 
need for a greater amount of learning after birth emerged, human evolution intensified 
parental care: ‘Only with intensified parental care in response to greater helplessness of the 
infant could selection favor the evolution of a large brain in a bipedal animal’ (Trevathan 
2011: 33). So the evolution of a more complex and resource-demanding developmental niche 
has been a key feature of human evolution. 
For this reason, it seems to us entirely natural to say that that human nature resides partly 
in the human developmental environment. We are a species that is particularly strongly 
influenced by niche construction, both selective niche construction over evolutionary 
timescales and developmental niche construction over ontogenetic timescales. A concept of 
nature according to which what is natural must come from the inside is particularly 
unsuitable for such a species. Imagine trying to determine the real nature of an ant, another 
powerful niche constructor, by removing the influence of the nest on the developing egg and 
embryo. The result would be either dead or biologically meaningless; and so it is for humans. 
The developmental niche has two fundamental functions. One function is to ensure the 
stable, reliable development of species-typical traits. So what explains typicality is the 
developmental systems dynamics within what we may call ‘normal’ parameters, some of 
which are provided by pre-existing physical and developmental constraints. The rest are 
ensured by reliably and stably inherited resources, which include not just the genome but also 
essential environmental resources that (among other functions) assist in the species-typical 
expression of the genetic factors. These stable resources also partially explain fixity. In 
addition, there are developmental mechanisms that buffer against internal (genetic, 
epigenetic, metabolic) and external perturbations. These are invoked when we talk about 
canalization. 
But one of our desiderata was that human nature needs to embrace and explain human 
diversity: ‘The search for a shared human nature cannot be the search for human universals; it 
must instead be a way to interpret and make sense of human diversity’ (Griffiths 2011: 326). 
Here the second function of the developmental niche comes in. Beyond ensuring reliable 
development, the developmental niche also provides input to developmental plasticity. 
Plasticity is often defined in terms of a genotype’s ability to produce different phenotypes in 
response to the environment. It would be more accurate, however, to say that the shape of the 
norm of reaction is a property of the whole developmental system. So what explains human 
diversity are differing developmental systems dynamics supported by modifications in the 
developmental niche. In other words, human diversity results primarily from the interaction 
between the evolved developmental system and a wide range of environments, including 
novel environments: ‘Bringing order to that diversity is not about identifying universal 
elements, but about finding order in the patterns of similarity and difference’ (Griffiths 2011: 
328). Developmental niche construction therefore provides dependability, but also adaptive 
flexibility, in the provision of necessary developmental resources. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have reiterated our view that human nature is simply human development. 
To the extent that we understand human developmental biology, developmental 
psychobiology, and developmental psychology, we understand human nature. Like Ramsey’s 
LTC account of human nature, this amounts to saying that human nature is a set of 
constraints on possible human developmental trajectories. Like Ramsey’s account, it is not 
without content because, although it does not identify a set of outcomes that are ‘unnatural’, 
it does say that ‘you can’t get there from here’. This gives our account, like Ramsey’s, a very 
special and positive feature: it is able to embrace human diversity as part of human nature. As 
we have argued in section 3.2, the objection that our account leads to a very complex picture 
of human nature is a non sequitur: human nature is complicated. 
Our account differs from Ramsey’s in a greater stress on the role of the human 
developmental environment—the developmental niche—in constituting human nature. We 
have argued that this reflects the direction of the human sciences in recent years. If it clashes 
with a folk-biological intuition that nature must come from ‘inside’ rather than ‘outside’, so 
much the worse for that intuition—we understand human nature better now. 
Kronfeldner and colleagues (Kronfeldner et al. 2014; Kronfeldner forthcoming) have 
proposed a ‘pluralistic solution’ for the missing consensus in the philosophical literature 
regarding a concept of human nature. They suggest that ‘different scientific fields are in need 
of different concepts of human nature, each fulfilling an independent epistemic role’. We are 
sympathetic to this general approach to the analysis of scientific concepts. We ourselves have 
made a similar suggestion about the concept of the gene: different gene concepts should be 
understood as ‘tools of research, as ways of classifying the experience shaped by 
experimentalists to meet their specific needs’ (Stotz and Griffiths 2008, p. 41; see also 
Griffiths and Stotz 2013). We do not, however, think that the same argument applies to the 
concept of human nature. Human nature is less a technical concept applied in the laboratory 
than a pragmatic, and even normative, tool applied in wider social contexts and with wide-
ranging consequences. This does not mean that different scientific endeavours cannot study 
different aspect of human nature, but they cannot do this without paying attention to other 
fields. There have been several attempts to impose a simplistic understanding of human 
nature, often derived from evolutionary biology, and to marginalize other sciences, such as 
those that focus on the human developmental environment. As Sandra Mitchell has argued, 
an ‘anything goes’ pluralism in science may do more harm than good, while a real 
‘integrative pluralism’ is a useful defense against reductionist imperialism (Mitchell 2003, 
2009). 
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Table 3.1 
Comparison between the genetic essentialism framework (GEF) and the three-factor 
model 
Genetic essentialist elements Three-factor model of animal natures 
(Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011a) (Linquist et al. 2011) 
Immutable and determined: thinking about 
genetic attributions leads people to view 
relevant phenotypes as less changeable and 
predetermined 
Fixity: phenotypes that are part of an animal’s 
nature do not depend on the particular 
environment in which the organism is raised 
and are hard to change by environmental 
manipulations 
Specific etiology: the tendency to discount 
additional causal explanations once genetic 
attributions are made 
Traits are either expression of the animal’s 
nature (and are expected to have the three 
features) or imposed by the environment 
(with opposite expectations) 
Homogeneous and discrete: leads to a focus 
on the central identifying features that are 
common to all group members, drawing 
attention away from in-group differentiating 
features 
Typicality: phenotypes that are part of an 
animal’s nature are typical of the entire 
species or of some natural subset such as 
males or juveniles 
Nature: phenotypes are perceived as a 
natural outcome (with positive normative 
Teleology: phenotypes that are part of an 
animal’s nature serve some purpose (with 
associations) positive normative associations) 
 
